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ABSTRACT 
Japan's aggressive export drive and chronic balance of trade surplus 
with the United States has generated considerable interest in the Japanese 
international trading sector. This paper presents an overview of Japan's 
performance in its trading relations. The paper begins with a discussion 
of the development, size, and importance of Japan's international trading 
sector. It then examines the composition, institutions, and policies for 
trade. This is followed by a review of Japan's balance of payments, capital 
flows, value of the yen, and direction of trade. 
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JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE PATTERNS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLICIES 
In many respects, international trade is the lifeblood of Japan's 
economy. For a country long on people but short in natural resources, the 
international economy offers much needed sources of supply and markets not 
available domestically. Japan's participation in the greater world economy 
enables it to enlarge the scope of its economic activity and to enhance 
productivity, efficiency, and economic well-being. As Japan discovered 
during its 250 years of seclusion, an island economy practicing autarky 
imposes constraints on its own economic progress and standard of living. 
This paper presents a broad overview of Japan's international trade 
and balance of payments. It begins with a discussion of the development, 
size, and importance of Japan's international trading sector. It then 
examines the composition, institutions, and policies for trade. This is 
followed by a review of Japan's balance of payments, capital flows, 
value of the yen, and direction of trade. 

SUMMARY 
Japan  ranks  t h i r d  among t h e  w o r l d ' s  l a r g e s t  e x p o r t i n g  n a t i o n s  ( a f t e r  t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s  and West Germany) and accoun t s  f o r  about 7  p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  t r a d e  
of non-Communist c o u n t r i e s .  A s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t ,  however,  
Japan depends l e s s  on f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s  t h a n  many o t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s .  
I n  1980,  Japan expor ted  15 p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  GNP, which was l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  
r e p o r t e d  f o r  A u s t r a l i a ,  F rance ,  I t a l y ,  West Germany, and Canada. The Uni ted  
S t a t e s  a t  10 p e r c e n t ,  however,  e x p o r t s  a  s m a l l e r  s h a r e  o f  GNP t h a n  J a p a n .  
S p e c i f i c  Japanese  i n d u s t r i e s ,  however, a r e  h e a v i l y  dependent  o n  e x p o r t  
m a r k e t s .  E x p o r t s ,  f o r  example,  accoun t  f o r  about h a l f  o f  t h e  o u t p u t  o f  
J a p a n '  s au tomobi le ,  machine t o o l ,  and t e l e v i s i o n  r e c e i v e r  i n d u s t r i e s  and 
approximate1 y  t h r e e - f o u r t h s  o f  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  watches  and cameras .  
J a p a n ' s  i m p o r t s ,  moreover ,  i n c l u d e  c r i t i c a l  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  e n e r g y ,  and 
food e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h e  wel l -being of  t h e  n a t i o n .  The p e r c e p t i o n  i n  J a p a n ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  t e n d s  toward t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y  i s  h e a v i l y  dependent  
on f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  
Such dependence on impor t s  o f  e s s e n t i a l  commodities h a s  been a  major  
concern  t o  policyrnakers.  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  economic d i s r u p t i o n s  o f  t h e  1970s 
added a  new dimension t o  J a p a n ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  i t s  s e c u r i t y .  Japan  now t e n d s  
t o  v iew t h r e a t s  t o  i t s  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  a s  more l i k e l y  t o  o c c u r  i n  t h e  economic 
than  m i l i t a r y  s p h e r e .  I ts  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  t e n d s  t o  t a k e  
a  wider  meaning t o  i n c l u d e  i n t e r r u p t i o n s  i n  s u p p l i e s  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  sudden 
p r i c e  h i k e s ,  r a p i d  changes i n  c u r r e n c y  v a l u e s ,  and food embargoes.  
J a p a n '  s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  t r a d e  i n c l u d e  t h e  powerf u l  M i n i s t r y  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Trade  and I n d u s t r y  (MITI),  which h o l d s  pr imary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  f o r m u l a t i n g  
and implementing economic p o l i c y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  b o t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  and 
domestic industries. It does coordinate policy with other ministries and the 
Prime Minister, but its interests lie mainly in enhancing the strength of 
domestic industry. MITI maintains close relations with businesses and factions 
within the Liberal Democratic Party and seeks a consensus on matters of policy. 
Japanese integrated trading companies serve as middlemen, financiers, 
intelligence gatherers, and developers. The largest nine firms handle more 
than half of the nation's imports and nearly half of the exports. They 
maintain large staffs abroad and also engage in considerable third-country 
trade, including the handling of an estimated 10 percent of all U.S. exports. 
Japan's methods for promoting exports has taken two paths. The first has 
been to develop industries that initially could manufacture products that would 
substitute for imports in the domestic economy and then become efficient 
enough to sell them abroad. The second was to provide incentives for firms 
to export. Most export incentives, however, were dropped during the 1960s 
and 1970s as Japan's balance of trade improved. The problem of the 1980s 
for Japan appears to be more of restraining exports than of promoting them. 
Japan's import policies have been undergoing considerable liberalization 
from the protectionist decades of the 1950s and 1960s. Under the recent 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the average tariffs on industrial imports are 
scheduled to decline from 5.0 to 2.5 percent. This compares favorably to the 
drop from 6.1 to 4.2 percent in the United States and 6.3 to 4.6 percent for 
the European Economic Community. Japan, however, still maintains rigid import 
quotas or high tariffs on agricultural products, leather, and other politically 
sensitive items. Problems with standards, customs procedures, and other 
nontariff barriers, also appear to keep imports of manufactured goods at 
relatively low levels. 
During t h e  1960s and l97Os,  t h e  v a l u e  of J a p a n ' s  merchand i se  e x p o r t s  
grew a t  an  average  annual  r a t e  o f  18 .9  p e r c e n t  t o  r e a c h  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  
$129.8 b i l l i o n  i n  1980. E x p o r t s  were  drawn i n t o  wor ld  m a r k e t s  by  economic 
l i b e r a l i z a t i o n  abroad ,  low p r i c e s  f o r  Japanese  p r o d u c t s ,  and a  widening recog- 
n i t i o n  o f  h i g h  q u a l i t y  i n  c e r t a i n  items. They were pushed i n t o  wor ld  m a r k e t s  
by domes t i c  r e c e s s i o n s  and s a t u r a t i o n  i n  home m a r k e t s .  
J a p a n t  s  i m p o r t s  c o n s i s t  main1 y  o f  m i n e r a l  f u e l s - - i n c l u d i n g  ~ e t r o l e u m - -  (50%), 
food ( l o % ) ,  raw m a t e r i a l s  ( 9 % ) ,  and machinery  and equipment- - including auto-  
mobi les- - (7%).  Export  s c o n s i s t  p r i m a r i l y  o f  machinery  and equipment ( 6 3 % ) ,  
m e t a l s  ( l 6 % ) ,  chemica l s  ( 5 % ) ,  and t e x t i l e s  ( 5 % ) .  
Japan  p r e f e r s  t o  measure i t s  b a l a n c e  o f  merchand i se  t r a d e  w i t h  s h i p p i n g  
c o s t s  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  i m p o r t s .  By t h i s  measure ,  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  
i t  h a s  i n c u r r e d  t r a d e  d e f i c i t s  o n l y  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  two m a j o r  o i l  c r i s e s  i n  
1973 and 1979. I f  impor t s  a r e  va lued  on a  free-on-board b a s i s ,  J a p a n  h a s  
had no merchandise  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  s i n c e  1963. 
I n  t e rms  o f  t h e  b a l a n c e  on c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t ,  Japan  recorded  d e f i c i t s  i n  
1973-75 and 1979-80. As f o r  t h e  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t ,  s i n c e  t h e  mid-1960s, long- 
term c a p i t a l  f lows have g e n e r a l l y  been n e g a t i v e  ( n e t  o u t  f l o w  o f  long-term 
inves tment  f u n d s ) ,  w h i l e  s h o r t - t e r m  c a p i t a l  f lows  have u s u a l l y  been  p o s i t i v e .  
A cumula t ive  s u r p l u s  h a s  acc rued  i n  J a p a n ' s  b a l a n c e  o f  payments,  which h a s  
i n c r e a s e d  i t s  r e s e r v e s  o f  go ld  and f o r e i g n  exchange from $2 b i l l i o n  i n  t h e  
l a t e  1960s t o  $25 b i l l i o n  i n  1980.  
The v a l u e  o f  t h e  yen h a s  f l u c t u a t e d  g r e a t l y  s i n c e  t h e  g r a d u a l  s h i f t  t o  
f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e s  t h a t  commenced i n  1971. From 360 yen p e r  d o l l a r  i n  
1971,  t h e  yen a p p r e c i a t e d  t o  265 yen per  d o l l a r  i n  1973 b e f o r e  t h e  impact  o f  
t h e  o i l  c r i s i s  began t o  be f e l t .  By 1976, i t  had weakened t o  297 p e r  d o l l a r  
b u t  r e g a i n e d  s t r e n g t h  o v e r  1978 t o  reach 219 yen p e r  d o l l a r  i n  1979.  With 
t h e  jump i n  o i l  p r i c e s  i n  1979,  however,  t h e  yen a g a i n  weakened and f e l l  t o  
227 p e r  d o l l a r  i n  1980. I n  1981,  i t  h a s  f l u c t u a t e d  between 205 and 239 yen 
pe r  d o l l a r .  
Japan t r a d e s  w i t h  n e a r l y  e v e r y  c o u n t r y  o f  t h e  world .  I n  1980, 47 p e r c e n t  
o f  i t s  merchandise  e x p o r t s  went t o  non-Communist, developed c o u n t r i e s ,  46  p e r c e n t  
t o  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s ,  and 7  p e r c e n t  t o  Communist c o u n t r i e s .  The United 
S t a t e s  wi th  24 p e r c e n t  of J a p a n ' s  e x p o r t s  was t h e  l a r g e s t  cus tomer ,  followed 
by West Germany, South Korea ,  Taiwan, and China w i t h  l e s s  t h a n  5 p e r c e n t  e a c h .  
J a p a n ' s  s u p p l i e r  c o u n t r i e s  r e f l e c t  i t s  needs  t o  import  food ,  e n e r g y ,  and 
raw m a t e r i a l s .  I n  1980,  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s  s u p p l i e d  60 pe rcen t  o f  J a p a n ' s  
impor t s  w i t h  h a l f  o f  t h a t  coming from t h e  Middle E a s t .  Developed c o u n t r i e s  
provided 35 p e r c e n t  and communist c o u n t r i e s  5 p e r c e n t  o f  J a p a n ' s  i m p o r t s .  
The Uni ted  S t a t e s  w i t h  17 p e r c e n t  and Saudia  Arab ia  w i t h  14 pe rcen t  were t h e  
l e a d i n g  e x p o r t e r s  t o  Japan .  Other  major  e x p o r t e r s  were I n d o n e s i a ,  t h e  United 
Arab Emira tes ,  A u s t r a l i a ,  and Canada. 
The s t r u c t u r e  o f  J a p a n ' s  t r a d e  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  f r i c t i o n .  
I n  most c a s e s  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  e x p o r t  ene rgy ,  food ,  and raw m a t e r i a l s  
t o  Japan cannot  absorb  an equa l  amount o f  Japanese  e x p o r t s  o f  f i n i s h e d  
p roduc t s .  T h i s  means t h a t  b i l a t e r a l  t r a d e  i s  u s u a l l y  no t  ba lanced .  Japan  
i s  fo rced  t o  run l a r g e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t s  w i t h  c o u n t r i e s  p r o v i d i n g  e s s e n t i a l  
impor t s  w h i l e  runn ing  s u r p l u s e s  w i t h  l a r g e  market  economies,  such a s  t h e  
United S t a t e s  and t h o s e  o f  Europe,  who can buy Japan1  s  e x p o r t s .  The r e s u l t i n g  
p o l i t i c a l  f r i c t i o n  i s  a  major  c h a l l e n g e  f o r  Japanese  policymakers . 
I .  TRADE DEPENDENCY 
Japan i s  one  of  t h e  g r e a t  t r a d i n g  n a t i o n s  o f  t h e  wor ld .  With i m p o r t s  
and e x p o r t s  o f  merchandise  t o t a l l i n g  $272 b i l l i o n  i n  1980,  Japan  i s  t h e  t h i r d  
l a r g e s t  t r a d i n g  n a t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  United S t a t e s  and West Germany. Among non- 
Communist c o u n t r i e s ,  Japan  accoun t s  f o r  about 10 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t r a d e  o f  t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  n a t i o n s  and 7 p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  t r a d e .  11 
A s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  g r o s s  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t ,  however, J a p a n  e x p o r t s  l e s s  
t h a n  o t h e r  major  t r a d i n g  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  wor ld .  I n  1980,  f o r  example,  i t  
expor ted  15 p e r c e n t  o f  i t s  GNP compared w i t h  18 p e r c e n t  f o r  A u s t r a l i a ,  20 
p e r c e n t  f o r  F r a n c e ,  23 p e r c e n t  f o r  I t a l y ,  28 p e r c e n t  f o r  West Germany and 
t h e  Uni ted  Kingdom, 30 pe rcen t  f o r  Canada, and 57 p e r c e n t  f o r  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s .  
The United S t a t e s ,  a t  10 p e r c e n t ,  however,  e x p o r t s  a  s m a l l e r  s h a r e  o f  i t s  
GNP t h a n  Japan .  - 21 
I n  t e r m s  o f  o v e r a l l  m a r k e t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  Japan  i s  l e s s  dependent  o n  f o r e i g n  
t r a d e  t h a n  many o t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  world .  For  s p e c i f i c  
i n d u s t r i e s ,  however,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e x p o r t  marke t s  a r e  ext reme1 y  i m p o r t a n t .  
E x p o r t s  account  f o r  about h a l f  o f  t h e  o u t p u t  o f  t h e  J a p a n e s e  a u t o m o b i l e ,  machine 
t o o l ,  and t e l e v i s i o n  r e c e i v e r  i n d u s t r i e s  and about t h r e e  f o u r t h s  o f  J a p a n ' s  
p r o d u c t i o n  of  watches  and cameras.  - 31  
I n  e x p o r t - o r i e n t e d  i n d u s t r i e s  such a s  t h e s e ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  a l l o w  
f i r m s  t o  a c h i e v e  economies o f  l a r g e - s c a l e  p r o d u c t i o n ,  volume s a l e s ,  and world- 
wide feedback f o r  product  improvement and t o  m i t i g a t e  demand f l u c t u a t i o n s  by  
b a l a n c i n g  domes t i c  and f o r e i g n  s a l e s  accord ing  t o  economic c o n d i t i o n s .  
11 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s ,  - 
Aug. 1981. p. 46-7. 
21 I b i d .  - 
31 Bank o f  J a p a n .  Economic S t a t i s t i c s  Monthly,  A p r i l  1981. p .  133-4, 
153-4: J a p a n  Economic J o u r n a l .  I n d u s t r i a l  Review of J a p a n l l 9 8 1 .  p. 4 6 f f .  
I n  terms of  c r i t i c a l  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  moreover,  Japan  i s  h i g h l y  dependent  
on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e .  Japanese  impor t s  of  food account f o r  about h a l f  o f  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n ' s  c a l o r i c  i n t a k e  and about 30 pe rcen t  o f  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t o t a l  food 
consumption.  - 41 Japan  a l s o  depends on impor t s  f o r  n e a r l y  a l l  i t s  c r u d e  pet roleum,  
i r o n  o r e ,  l ead  o r e ,  copper o r e ,  b a u x i t e ,  wool,  and c o t t o n .  It impor t s  about 75 
p e r c e n t  of  i t s  c o a l  and z i n c  o r e .  - 5 /  
Such dependence on impor t s  o f  food and c r i t i c a l  raw m a t e r i a l s  h a s  been 
a  major  concern  t o  government pol icymakers .  Economic d i s r u p t i o n s  o f  t h e  
1970s ,  moreover ,  added a  new dimension t o  J a p a n ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  i t s  economic 
i n s e c u r i t y .  These d i s r u p t i o n s  i n c l u d e  t h e  U.S. s u s p e n s i o n  o f  d o l l a r  con- 
v e r t i b i l i t y  i n  1971,  t h e  o i l  c r i s e s  o f  1973 and 1979, and t h e  U.S. embargo 
on soy  bean e x p o r t s  i n  1973. - 61 
As Japan began t h e  decade of t h e  1980s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  such import  dependence 
and r e c e n t  h i s t o r y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic d i s r u p t i o n s  caused many pol icymakers  
t o  c o n s i d e r  t h r e a t s  t o  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  more l i k e l y  t o  occur  
i n  t h e  economic t h a n  m i l i t a r y  s p h e r e .  T h i s  focus  on economic r a t h e r  t h a n  
m i l i t a r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  was f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h e  U.S. n u c l e a r  umbre l l a ,  which 
provided p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  l a r g e - s c a l e  w a r f a r e .  J a p a n ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  
s e c u r i t y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t e n d s  t o  t a k e  a  broad meaning t o  i n c l u d e  i n t e r r u p t i o n s  
i n  s u p p l i e s  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  sudden p r i c e  h i k e s ,  r a p i d  changes  i n  c u r r e n c y  
v a l u e s ,  and food embargoes. 
41 J a p a n .  Economic P lann ing  Agency. Economic Out l o o k ,  Japan ' 81 .  Tokyo. 
~ c o n o m i c  P lann ing  Agency, c .  1981. p .  26.  
5 /  J a p a n .  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r .  Monthly S t a t i s t i c s  o f  Japan ,  - 
S e p t .  1980. Tokyo. p. 4 6 .  Krause ,  Lawrence, and Sukeo Sek iguch i .  Japan  and 
t h e  World Economy. I n  P a t r i c k ,  H . ,  and H. Rosovsky, e d s .  A s i a ' s  New G i a n t .  
Washington,  Brookings ,  1976. p. 386. 
6 /  Akao, Nobutoshi and Maureen White. J a p a n ' s  Economic S e c u r i t y .  
~ n t e r e c o n o m i c s  , ~ a y / J u n e  1981. p  . 115-20. 
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XI. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Following J a p a n ' s  de fea t  i n  World War 11, U.S. occupat ion  f o r c e s  r i g i d l y  
c o n t r o l l e d  J a p a n ' s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s .  Imports were l i m i t e d  t o  
e s s e n t i a l  food and raw m a t e r i a l s ,  wi th  a  s i z a b l e  propor t ion  f inanced by U.S. 
economic a s s i s t a n c e .  Over t h e  1945-52 pe r iod ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  provided 
Japan with ne t  economic a s s i s t a n c e  of $1,938 m i l l i o n ,  of  which Japan e v e n t u a l l y  
r epa id  $490 m i l l i o n .  Approximately 59 percent  of  t h e  a i d  was i n  food o r  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  equipment, whi le  15 percent  was i n  i n d u s t r i a l  m a t e r i a l s ,  and 12 
percent  i n  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  v e h i c l e s  and equipment. Aid imports  amounted t o  
19 percent  of t o t a l  Japanese imports over t h e  occupat ion per iod .  - 71 
With extreme shor tages  of s u p p l i e s  i n  J a p a n ' s  domestic economy, expor t s  
d id  not  begin t o  recover  u n t i l  t he  Korean Conf l i c t  when s p e c i a l  procurement 
by United Nations fo rces  induced boom cond i t i ons  i n  J apan ' s  i n d u s t r i e s .  
By 1960, Japan ' s  expor t s  had grown t o  account f o r  3 .6  percent  of  those  
of non-Communist c o u n t r i e s ,  enough t o  rank s i x t h  and t o  be  a t  approximately 
the  same l e v e l  a s  t h e  Nether lands and I t a l y .  
Over t h e  1960s, t h e  d o l l a r  va lue  of J a p a n ' s  expor t s  grew a t  an average 
annual r a t e  of 16.9 pe rcen t ,  more than 75 percent  f a s t e r  than t h e  average of  
a l l  non-Communist c o u n t r i e s .  By 1970, t h e r e f o r e ,  J a p a n ' s  expor t s  had r i s e n  t o  
account f o r  6 .8  percent  of a l l  free-world expor t s ,  up cons ide rab ly  from t h e  
3.6 percent  i n  1960. - 81 
71 Nanto, Dick K .  The United S t a t e s '  Role i n  t h e  Postwar Economic Recovery 
of ~ a p a n .  Doctoral D i s s e r t a t i o n .  Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U n i v e r s i t y ,  1976. p. 
66-69, 181. 
81 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F inanc i a l  S t a t i s t i c s ,  
May 1377. Washington. p. 56-7 
During t h e  1970s ,  t h e  growth r a t e  i n  J a p a n ' s  domes t i c  economy dropped i n  
h a l f  from t h e  d o u b l e - d i g i t  r a t e s  o f  p r e v i o u s  decades .  Japan  a l s o  faced  s h a r p l y  
h i g h e r  b i l l s  f o r  imported energy  and raw m a t e r i a l s .  Th i s  caused Japanese  
i n d u s t r i e s  t o  look  abroad f o r  new marke t s .  As a  r e s u l t ,  J a p a n ' s  e x p o r t s  
con t inued  t o  grow a t  an  average annual r a t e  o f  21 p e r c e n t  t o  account  f o r  
7 .1  p e r c e n t  o f  a l l  non-Communist c o u n t r y  e x p o r t s  i n  1980. J a p a n ' s  t r a d e  
grew s o  r a p i d l y  t h a t  whereas t h e  United S t a t e s  expor ted  f i v e  t imes  a s  much 
a s  Japan  i n  1960,  by 1980, i t  expor ted  l e s s  t h a n  t w i c e  a s  much. - 9/ 
During t h e  1970s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  J a p a n ' s  e x p o r t  growth provided a  s t i m u l u s  
t o  s l u g g i s h  domes t i c  economic marke t s .  I n  t h a t  s e n s e ,  J a p a n ' s  r e c e n t  economic 
growth h a s  been "expor t - led  ." During t h e  e a r l i e r  postwar p e r i o d ,  however,  J a p a n ' s  
r a p i d  growth i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  a p p e a r s  t o  have been a s  much a  r e s u l t  of  
t h e  r a p i d  growth i n  i t s  domest ic  economy a s  a  cause  o f  i t .  - 101 
The development of J a p a n ' s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  economy fol lowed two d i s t i n c t  
p a t t e r n s .  The f i r s t  i s  a  p rocess  o f  i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i n g  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  
A s  Japan  began t o  i n d u s t r i a l i z e ,  i t  f i r s t  imported c e r t a i n  p r o d u c t s .  As 
impor t s  r o s e ,  domest ic  p r o d u c t i o n  was i n i t i a t e d  and g r a d u a l l y  s u b s t i t u t e d  
f o r  impor t s .  Impor t s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  would peak and t h e n  d e c l i n e ,  a s  Japanese  
p roduc t ion  r o s e .  Even tua l1  y  t h e  Japanese  product  would g a i n  accep tance  on 
world marke t s  and e x p o r t s  would r i s e .  A f t e r  a  t i m e ,  however, a s  domest ic  
wage r a t e s  r o s e ,  p roducers  i n  newly i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  became more 
e f f i c i e n t  , o r  energy c o s t s  became t o o  h i g h ,  Japanese p roduc t ion  and e x p o r t s  
could  peak. Imports  a l s o  could  r i s e  a g a i n .  
9 /  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F i n a n c i a l  S t a t i s t i c s ,  
J u l y  i 9 8 l .  Washington.  p.  46 .  
101 Ohkawa, Kazushi and H.  Rosovsky. Japanese  Economic Growth. P a l o  
~ l t o T ~ t a n f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1973. p.  173-5. 
The second pattern is one of growing relative labor costs forcing industries 
to move up to higher value-added products. As Japan's wage costs have risen 
relative to those in less developed nations, its traditional products have 
become less able to compete both at home and in international markets. This 
has required that Japan move up the technological spectrum from labor-intensive 
manufactures to more sophisticated and technology-intensive products. 111 
Hence, Japan, which began by exporting such labor-intensive products as textiles, 
tea, and toys, moved on to cameras, cars, steel, ships, and television receivers, 
and is now expanding into camputers, copy machines, machine tools, and tele- 
communications equipment. 
111 Lifson, Thomas R. Japanese Business Strategies for the 1980's. -
Japan Report, v. X X V I ,  May 1, 1980. p. 2-3. 

111. INSTITUTIONS FOR TRADE 
A. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). MITI holds primary 
responsibility for formulating and implementing international trade policy, al- 
though it does so by seeking a consensus among interested parties. The Ministry 
coordinates trade policy with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which holds 
primary responsibility for international political relations, and the Ministry 
of Finance, which becomes involved in matters pertaining to government revenues 
or expenditures. MITI also coordinates trade policy with the Economic Planning 
Agency, the Bank of Japan, and the Ministries of Agriculture, Transport, Tele- 
communications, and Health on issues affecting their interests. The Prime 
Minister, Diet, and Fair Trade Commission also can restrict MITI's operations. 1 2 1  - 
MITI is responsible not only for exports and imports, but also for all 
domestic industries and businesses not specifically covered by other ministries, 
investments in plant and equipment, pollution control, energy and power, some 
aspects of foreign economic assistance, and consumer complaints. Such broad 
responsibility allows MITI to integrate conflicting policies, such as pollution 
control and export competitiveness, to prevent excessive damage to industries. 1 3 1  - 
MITI serves as an architect of industrial policy, an arbiter for industrial 
problems and disputes, and a regulator. MITI'S major objective is to strengthen 
Japan's industrial base and to insure that Japan's foreign trade operates 
121 FTC Warns Against MITI's Administrative Guidance. The Japan Economic - 
Journal, v. 19, Sept. 1, 1981. p. 2. 
131 Ojimi, Yoshihisa. A Government Ministry: The Case of the Ministry of 
1nterGtional Trade and Industry. In Vogel, E. F. Modern Japanese Organization 
and Decision-making. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975. p. 101. 
smoothly and e f f i c i e n t l y .  MITI m a i n t a i n s  v e r y  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  domes t i c  
p roducers  and key f a c t i o n s  w i t h i n  t h e  L i b e r a l  Democratic P a r t y .  It d o e s  n o t  
manage Japanese  t r a d e  and i n d u s t r y  a long t h e  l i n e s  o f  a  c e n t r a l l y  planned 
economy. It d o e s ,  however,  p rov ide  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  guidance and o t h e r  d i r e c t i o n - -  
e i t h e r  formal o r  informal- - to  i n d u s t r i e s  on modern iza t ion ,  t echno logy ,  p l a n s  
f o r  inves tments  i n  new p l a n t  and equipment,  and on competing both  w i t h  each 
o t h e r  and w i t h  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  - 141 
With some i n d u s t r i e s ,  MITI h a s  s t r o n g  s t a t u t o r y  a u t h o r i t y  t o  i n t e r v e n e .  
I n  o t h e r s ,  however, i t s  i n f l u e n c e  i s  weak (newspapers ,  f o r  example).  - 151 
M I T I f s  guidance i s  backed,  however,  by i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  deve lop  a  consensus  
among t h o s e  i n d u s t r i e s  r e c e i v i n g  i t s  adv ice ;  i t s  power t o  g r a n t  c e r t a i n  
l i c e n s e s ;  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  w i t h  t h e  Japan Development Bank, J a p a n ' s  Export-Import  
Bank, and t h e  Asian Development Bank; and a  b a s i c  conf idence  J a p a n e s e  b u s i n e s s  
seems t o  have i n  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h e  gu idance .  - 161 A s  a  l a s t  r e s o r t ,  MITI 
can  e i t h e r  "go p u b l i c "  and b r i n g  pee r  p r e s s u r e  on t h e  r e l u c t a n t  f i r m  o r  
e x e r t  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  on t h e  f i r m ' s  banks o r  c r e d i t o r s .  - 171 
The c l o s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between MITI and Japanese  i n d u s t r i e s  means t h a t  
f o r e i g n  t r a d e  p o l i c y  o f t e n  complements and i s  c o o r d i n a t e d  w i t h  t h e  m i n i s t r y ' s  
e f f o r t s  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  domes t i c  manufac tu r ing  i n t e r e s t s .  MITI f a c i l i t a t e d  
t h e  e a r l y  development o f  n e a r l y  a l l  major  Japanese  i n d u s t r i e s  by p r o v i d i n g  
p r o t e c t i o n  from import  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  h e l p  i n  
141 I b i d .  Vogel,  E z r a  F. Japan a s  No. One. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
unive=i ty  P r e s s ,  1979. p. 72-3. 
151 Magaziner , I r a  C .  and Thomas M.  Hout . Japanese  I n d u s t r i a l  P o l i c y .  
 ond doc P o l i c y  S t u d i e s  I n s t i t u t e ,  1980. p. 32-3. 
161 Vogel.  No. One. p .  71-3. -
171 Lepon, J e f f r e y  M .  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Guidance i n  Japan.  F l e t c h e r  Forum. 
v ,  2 , M a y  1978. p .  148-50. 
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licensing foreign technology or affiliates, access to foreign exchange, or 
assistance in mergers. 181 
By the 1980s, however, with reduced import tariffs, ready access by firms 
to foreign exchange, and international codes preventing government subsidies, 
MITI's ability to protect domestic industry from imports has been weakened con- 
siderably. In 1981, for example, MITI initially stood by while a surge of 
lower-cost aluminum imports from the United States threatened Japan's aluminum 
industry. The assistance program MITI eventually proposed has faced resistance 
by both the United States and Japan's Ministry of Finance. - 19/ 
MITI also plays the leading role in agreements by Japanese industry to 
limit exports t9 various countries. In 1978, for example, MITI requested 
that the motor vehicle, motorcycle, copy machine, wrist watch, and camera 
industries limit their exports to 1977 levels. - 20/ A later example, in 1981, 
was Japan's voluntary export restraints on automobiles to the United States 
and Canada. In the discussions over the issue, MITI, along with the Foreign 
Ministry, convinced the Japanese auto industry to go along with the restraints 
despite industry objections. MITI allocated the export quota among the various 
manufacturers and monitored their compliance. z/ 
181 Magaziner, Industrial Policy, p. 45-90. For a description of MITI's 
activEies in developing the computer, steel, and motor vehicle industries, 
see Kaplan, Eugene. Japan, the Government-Business Relationship. Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972. p. 77-158. 
191 Japanese Aluminum Producers Blast 'Unfair' U.S. Competition. Journal -
of Commerce, April 29, 1981. p. 13A. Cullison, A.E. Japanese Impose Tariff 
Quotas on Imports of Aluminum Ingots. Journal of Commerce, October 26, 1981. 
p. 12A. 
201 Oriental Economist, Japan Economic Yearbook, 1979180. Tokyo, Oriental 
~conozst, 1979. p. 35. 
211 Letter, Okawara, Yoshio to William F. Smith. May 7, 1981. Cullinson, -
A.  E. Japanese Automakers to Comply with Quotas. Journal of Commerce, May 
4, 1981. p. 1, 5. 
B. The Japan  E x t e r n a l  Trade  O r g a n i z a t i o n  (JETRO) . JETRO was e s t a b l i s h e d  by 
MITI i n  1958 i n  o r d e r  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  J a p a n ' s  expor t  promotion e f f o r t s .  It 
o p e r a t e s  a s  a  n o n - p r o f i t  f a c i l i t y  i n i t i a l l y  c a p i t a l i z e d  a t  two b i l l i o n  yen.  The 
J a p a n e s e  government p r o v i d e s  more t h a n  h a l f  o f  i t s  annual  o p e r a t i n g  budge t .  - 221 
I n i t i a l l y ,  JETRO's a c t i v i t i e s  focussed mainly  on promoting J a p a n ' s  pro- 
d u c t s  i n  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s .  As J a p a n ' s  e x p o r t e r s  e s t a b l i s h e d  themse lves  i n  world 
marke t s  and J a p a n ' s  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  tu rned  from d e f i c i t  t o  s u r p l u s ,  however,  
JETRO' s r o l e  h a s  s h i f t e d  from s t r i c t 1  y  expor t  promotion t o  more v a r i e d  a c t i v i t i e s .  
These i n c l u d e  t h e  f u r t h e r a n c e  o f  mutual  unders tand ing  w i t h  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s ,  
import  promot ion,  l i a i s o n  between s m a l l  b u s i n e s s e s  i n  Japan  and t h e i r  o v e r s e a s  
c o u n t e r p a r t s ,  and d a t a  d i s s e m i n a t i o n .  JETRO m a i n t a i n s  o f  f i c e s  i n  more t h a n  
s i x t y  c o u n t r i e s .  
C.  T rad ing  Companies. A  major  Japanese  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r a d e  h a s  been t h e  development o f  t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  ( g e n e r a l )  t r a d i n g  company. 
These were f i r s t  o rgan ized  d u r i n g  t h e  l a t e  1800s t o  r e p l a c e  t h e  f o r e i g n  
companies dominat ing Japanese  t r a d e  and t o  p rov ide  f o r e i g n  marke t ing  s e r v i c e s  
t o  Japanese  f i r m s  u n f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e  o u t s i d e  world .  - 231 
The t r a d i n g  company's r o l e  i n i t i a l l y  was t o  a c t  a s  s p e c i a l i z e d  w h o l e s a l e r s  
f o r  Japanese  manufac tu re r s  i n  domest ic  and f o r e i g n  marke t s  and t o  buy raw 
m a t e r i a l s  and o t h e r  i n p u t s  f o r  manufac tu r ing  o p e r a t i o n s .  L a t e r ,  however, 
Japanese  t r a d i n g  companies developed t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  s e r v e  a s  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ,  absorb  f o r e i g n  exchange r i s k  f o r  t h e i r  cus tomers ,  p rov ide  
221 Japan E x t e r n a l  Trade O r g a n i z a t i o n .  Japan E x t e r n a l  Trade O r g a n i z a t i o n ,  -
1979. Tokyo, JETRO, 1979. p .  2-4. 
231 Krause and Sekiguchi  , Japan and World Economy, p .  389-92. -
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technical advice to small firms whose products might be exported, and engage 
in direct investment overseas, often to secure stable sources of supply. 
A few large trading companies have grown to form the core of zaibatsu 
groupings of businesses. 
Trading companies, moreover, engage in trade not only for Japanese 
firms, but among third countries. Such transactions might include, for 
example, arranging for the sale of a U.S. chemical plant to the Soviet Union 
or importing Rumanian urea into Bangladesh. 241 Third country trade now 
accounts for more than 10 percent of the sales of the nine largest trading 
companies. 251 Japanese trading companies handle approximately 10 percent 
of all U.S. exports. - 261 
Japan's integrated trading companies enter into a variety of transactions. 
Each company will handle as many as 20,000 different products with numerous 
suppliers. This enables them to arrange multi-product deals encompassing many 
facets of a project. An example would be the export of a turnkey petrochemical 
plant to Singapore requiring equipment, technology, and consulting services 
of many different firms. x/ 
In 1980 more than 6,000 trading companies existed in Japan. The top nine 
companies, however, accounted for the bulk of the transactions. The leaders 
24/ Young, Alexander K. The Sogo Shosha: Japan's Multinational Trading 
compazes. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1979. p. 9-10. 
251 Kanabayashi, Masayoshi. Japan's Big and Evolving Trading Firms: Can 
the uX. Use Something Like Them? Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 1980. p. 56. 
261 Lachica, Eduardo. Unlikely American Exporter: Japan. Wall Street -
Journal, Nov. 11, 1981. p. 31. 
27/ Young, Sogo Shosha, p. 4-9. -
o f  t h e  t o p  n i n e  were M i t s u b i s h i  w i t h  s a l e s  over  t h e  f i s c a l  y e a r  of  $63.4 
b i l l i o n ,  fo l lowed by M i t s u i  w i t h  $57.6 b i l l i o n ,  C .  I t o h  w i t h  $48.7 b i l l i o n ,  
and Marubeni wi th  $46.3 b i l l i o n .  Sumitomo and Nissho-Iwai w i t h  s a l e s  of 
$43.9 and $29.9 b i l l i o n ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a l s o  were major  t r a d e r s .  - 281 
Toge the r  t h e  t o p  n i n e  t r a d i n g  companies r ecorded  g r o s s  s a l e s  i n  f i s c a l  y e a r  
1980 of $330 b i l l i o n  o r  an amount e q u i v a l e n t  t o  30.2  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  
GNP. - 291 These companies a l s o  h a n d l e  more t h a n  h a l f  of  J a p a n ' s  impor t s  and 
n e a r l y  h a l f  of  J a p a n ' s  e x p o r t s .  There  i s  g r e a t e r  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  i n  c e r t a i n  
p roduc t s .  These companies,  f o r  example, h a n d l e  more t h a n  90 p e r c e n t  of J a p a n ' s  
impor t s  o f  s t e e l ,  70 p e r c e n t  of  food i m p o r t s ,  and more t h a n  50 p e r c e n t  o f  
i m p o r t s  o f  t e x t i l e s  and f u e l s .  They a l s o  a r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  n e a r l y  90 pe rcen t  
of J a p a n ' s  e x p o r t s  of  s t e e l ,  60 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  chemica l s ,  and 50 
p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t e x t i l e s .  I n  1980 n e a r l y  6 ,000  Japanese  were employed abroad 
by  t h e  b i g  n i n e  t r a d i n g  companies.  - 30/ 
D .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Banks. J a p a n ' s  e x t e n s i v e  f o r e i g n  t r a d e  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
c a p i t a l  f lows a r e  f inanced  by  a  well-developed banking sys tem.  The sys tem was 
o r g i n a l l y  p a t t e r n e d  a f t e r  Eng land ' s  bu t  h a s  subsequen t ly  evolved i n t o  one w i t h  
i t s  own s t r u c t u r e  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  It c o n s i s t s  o f  a  m i x t u r e  o f  government 
and p r i v a t e  banking i n s t i t u t i o n s  w i t h  a  h i g h e r  d e g r e e  o f  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  t h a n  
i n  most c o u n t r i e s .  311 
28/ Aoyama, Norio .  The Role o f  t h e  Japanese  Sogoshosha. Paper  p resen ted  
a t  t h y u .  S.-Japan Bus iness  Conference ,  L i n c o l n ,  Nebraska.  Oct . 6 ,  1981. 
291 I b i d .  -
30/ K e i z a i  Koho, 
7
31/ Bieda,  Ken. 
s y d n e T  John Wiley and 
Japan 1981, p .  31. 
The S t r u c t u r e  and Opera t ion  o f  t h e  Japanese  Economy. 
Sons A u s t r a l a s i a ,  1970. p .  134-35. 
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The Bank of Japan stands at the head of the banking structure. Although 
it coordinates policy with the Ministry of Finance, it maintains considerable 
independence in pursuing monetary policy and regulating activities of Japan's 
banking community. 
The commercial banking system centers on fourteen city banks (including 
the Bank of Tokyo), which tend to be larger and to have headquarters in more 
populous cities than Japan's sixty-three regional banks. ?lost of these city 
banks are very large. When ranked by assets (in 1979) the Dai-Ichi Kangyo 
Bank was the tenth largest in the world, the Fuji Bank the fourteenth, the 
Sumitomo Bank the sixteenth, the Mitsubishi Bank the seventeenth, the Sanwa 
Bank the nineteenth, and the Norinchukin Bank the twentieth. - 321  
The six largest Japanese banks, therefore, rank among the top twenty in 
the world. All but the Norinchukin Bank also rank among the top twenty in 
terms of deposits. When ranked by pre-tax earnings, however, only the Industrial 
Bank of Japan at eighteenth place was counted among the world's top twenty. 
The Bank of Tokyo was established as a special foreign exchange bank 
with the purpose of facilitating foreign exchange transactions and export 
financing. 331 All the city banks and some of the regional banks, however, 
also are authorized to deal in foreign exchange, finance international trans- 
actions, and make international loans. Sixty-four foreign banks, including 
many American, also maintain subsidiaries in Japan and handle international 
transactions. 341 
32/ The Top 500.  The Banker, v. 1 3 0 .  p. 125. -
331  Adams, T.F.M. and Iwao Hoshii. A Financial History of the New Japan. 
~ok~oT~odansha International, 1972. p. 104-5.  
3 4 /  Ranking Foreign Banks in Japan. Euromoney, March 1981. p. 79. -
The Export-Import Bank of Japan plays an important role in financing costly 
exports such as whole plants or major pieces of equipment. Such export financing 
often is vital in international bidding on major projects and is a key component 
in Japan's programs for export promotion. In mid-1981, the Bank reported a total 
of 5.02 trillion yen in loans and discounts outstanding. - 3 5 /  
E. International Organizations for Trade. Japan holds membership in the 
United Nations (U.N.), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It also participates in the international organi- 
zations whose focus is economic development. 
As a member of the IMF, Japan cooperates with other countries in moderating 
short-run volatility in the value of the yen and in following guidelines for 
maintaining a strong and viable international currency system. It is obliged 
to follow IMF guidelines, for example, which prohibit countries from manipulating 
exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective 
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage 
over other members. This places a constraint on Japan's ability to protect 
its less efficient export industries by holding the value of the yen at an 
artificially low level. 361 
Japan's membership in the OECD also constrains its foreign economic 
policy to some extent. The 0ECD1s "gentlemen's agreement" on guidelines for 
government-supported export credits, for example, places a floor on interest 
rates and other terms of loans to less developed countries which often are 
3 5 1  The Bank of Japan. Economic -
3 6 /  International Monetary Fund. 
p. 57, 
Statistics Monthly, August 1981. p. 105. 
Annual Report 1980. Washington, IMF, 1980. 
used to finance imports. z/ Japan occasionally circumvents such guidelines, 
however, by combining economic assistance and loans. 
GATT provides the structure under which Japan hammers out most detailed 
international agreements on import and export policies. In particular, the 
Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations resulted in the reduction 
of many of its tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. =/ Japan also negotiates 
bilaterally with countries on economic matters of mutual interest. 
37/ Eximbank and the War on Export Credit Subsidies: Should We Compete? 
~radeTolic~ Review, v. 2, July 1981. p. 3. 
381 Key MTN Agreements Open Markets in European Community, Canada, and -
Japan. Business America, v. 4, Feb. 23, 1981. p. 3-9. 

IV. FOREIGN TRADE POLICIES 
A. Export policies. The fundamental proposition that Japan must "export 
or perish" (if not perish, at least suffer a sizable decrease in standard 
of living) appears to underlie much of its export policymaking. It tends 
however, to view exports not as an end but as a means by which it can buy 
imports. MITI feels that since Japan is lacking in resources and has a high 
population density, it cannot attain a high income level without importing a 
variety of primary and finished goods while exporting finished products. - 391 
Following World War 11, Japan's re-emergence as a major exporter was 
not accomplished without considerable difficulty. Without raw material exports 
that tend to sell themselves, Japan had to crack open foreign markets that 
often were unfamiliar or even hostile. Developing markets abroad for products 
bearing the label, "Made in Japan," did not come easily. The president 
of the Sony Corporation, for example, after his first visit to the United 
States left with the impression that selling Sony products here would be 
impossible. - 401 Japanese exports also were not always afforded the lowest 
tariff rates. Although Japan joined GATT in 1955, for example, fourteen 
nations (including the United Kingdom, France, and Australia) did not extend 
most-favored-nation treatment to Japanese exports until later. 411 -
Until the late 1960s, Japan's ability to export usually fell short of 
its appetite for foreign products. With no floating exchange rate to elicit 
391 Japan. Ministry of International Trade and Industry. White Paper on 
the ~Zernational Trade, 1979. Tokyo. Foreign Press Center, 1979. p. 97. 
401 Weymouth, Lally. Meet Mr. Sony, How the Japanese Outsmart Us. The 
~ t l a n s c  Monthly, v. 244, Nov. 1979. p. 37. 
41/ Krause and Sekiguchi, Japan and the World Economy, p. 414. -
market forces to reduce any trade deficit, Japan turned to either restricting 
imports or promoting exports. Its methods for promoting exports took two 
paths. The first was to develop world-class industries whose products would 
initially substitute for imports and then compete in international markets. 
The second was to provide incentives for firms to export. 
During the two decades following World War 11, Japan's export strategy 
took the form of a combination of taxes and government assistance to build 
its export industries. After joining the IMF in 1964, however, it had to 
drop its major export incentive, the total exemption of export income from 
taxes, in order to comply with IMF procedures. Special tax treatment of 
costs for market development and export promotion were maintained, however, 
into the 1970s. c/ 
Once Japanese export industries became established, most have been able 
to compete without abnormal government assistance. Japan's current programs 
of export promotion and of export finance appear to differ little from those in 
other major countries. MITI's problem of the 1980s appears to be more one of 
restraining Japanese exports, in the face of increased protectionist pressures 
abroad, not promoting them. 
B. Import policies. By the late 1950s, Japan's international trade had 
regained its prewar level and its balance of payments was displaying enough 
strength that the rigid protection imposed during the immediate postwar 
recovery period became increasingly difficult to justify. The IMF, GATT, 
and OECD all placed strong pressure on Japan to free its commerce and inter- 
42/ Ishimine, Tomotaka. Fiscal Incentives for Japan's Export and Direct 
~ o r e i z  Investment. Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, v. 32, 
1978. p. 174-5. 
national payments system. In 1960, therefore, Japan adopted a policy of gradual 
trade liberalization. 431 This liberalization has continued into the 1980s. 
The process of liberalization involved easing import quotas, reducing tariff 
rates, freeing transactions in foreign exchange, and admitting foreign capital 
and technology into Japanese industries. By 1964, Japan was able to achieve 
the level of trade liberalization required for full membership in GATT, the 
IMF, and the OECD. 441 Not until December 1968, however, did it make the 
political decision truly to begin to open its economy to international compe- 
tition. .By then Japan's trade problem had shifted from one of deficits to 
surpluses. Even with liberalization, however, its economy was still relatively 
protected. 451 
Under the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations completed under GATT in 1967, 
moreover, Japan was committed to reduce its tariff rates. Japan's average tariff 
rates on consumer goods, therefore, dropped from 23.6 percent in 1968 to 11.2 
percent in 1972. For capital goods, the corresponding tariff rates were cut 
from 15.2 to 9.3 percent over the same period. 461 -
During the 1970s, with Japan's strong export performance, the remaining 
barriers to trade in its industrial sector became increasingly difficult to 
justify. Under the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations concluded 
in 1979, Japan is scheduled to reduce import tariffs by 1987 on about 2,600 
industrial products and about 200 agricultural or fishery products. In addition, 
431 Ho, Alfred K. Japan's Trade Liberalization in the 1960s. White Plains, -
N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973. p. 6-7. 
441 Ho, Japan's Trade Liberalization, p. 16. -
451 Krause and Sekiguchi, Japan and World Economy, p. 426-7. -
461 Ibid., p. 428. -
it has signed codes which call for the simplification of application procedures 
for import licenses; publication of standards for manufactured goods and 
systems of approved imports; setting of a customs valuation standard at 
sales price; and government procurement, including that by the Nippon Telegraph 
and Telephone Company, based on national treatment and non-discrimination. - 471 
When the Tokyo Round tariff cuts are fully implemented, Japan's average 
tariff rate on total industrial imports (dutiable plus duty-free, excluding 
should decline from 5.0 to 2.5 percent. This compares favorably with 
the drop from 6.1 to 4.2 percent scheduled for the United States and from 6.3 to 
4.6 percent for the European Economic Community. On most industrial products, 
therefore, tariffs no longer can be considered a serious barrier to imports into 
Japan. %/ The tariff on automobiles, for example, is zero. 
In terms of import quotas, Japan still maintains residual quantitative 
restrictions on 5 manufactured goods and 22 agricultural products. This is down 
considerably from the 490 items in 1962, the 136 items in 1964, the 90 items 
in 1970, and the 31 items in 1973. The items under quota restrictions, such 
as oranges, beef, flour, fruit juice, shore fish, and leather, however, 
have proved to be highly visible and the subject of considerable complaints 
by exporting countries. 491 
Japan certainly is not the only country which imposes import quotas; the 
stringency of its quotas, however, opens it to foreign criticism. The United 
States, for example, also maintains an import quota on beef, although it has 
471 Japan, MITI, White Paper 1979, p. 105. -
481 U.S. Department of Commerce. International Trade Administration. Tokyo 
~oundyarif Reduct ions. Washington, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1980. p .  1-3. 
491 Krause and Sekiguchi, Japan and World Economy, p. 426. MITI, White 
paper-79, p. 107. U.S. Congress, U.S.-Japan Trade Report, 1980. p. 54-63. 
only a minor effect on the U.S. price of beef. In Japan, however, the price 
of beef is so high that at times cattle have been air-freighted in for slaughter, 
since the quota does not apply to living animals. 
Unlike Japan's policy to eliminate gradually most import barriers in its 
industrial sector, protection of its agricultural sector remains strong. 
Agricultural import policy, however, is determined mainly by Japan's agricultural 
ministry, not MITI. This ministry has little incentive to liberalize agricultural 
imports, since Japan's farmers export little, are highly dependent on government 
price supports, and with the shortage of land, have only distant hope of 
competing fully with imports. As a result of these policies, in 1979, food 
cost 70 percent more in Tokyo than it did in New York City or Paris. =/ 
Although some very tough residual attitudes of protectionism remain, 
Japan is generally considered to be an open trading nation, except in most 
agricultural products. 511 Nontariff barriers to foreign products in Japan, 
however, still make market penetration difficult. These include an intricate 
and unwieldy system of distribution, the tendency of firms belonging to zaibatsu 
groupings to buy from affiliated companies, arbitrary product standards, com- 
plicated and time-consuming customs procedures, long time lags in regulatory 
approval, and the fact that most foreign firms had been shut out of the Japanese 
market during the years when the economy was growing rapidly. 
In November 1981 the United States proposed to Japan that it reduce a 
number of trade barriers to reduce its export surplus. These included removing 
50/ Gutman, M. and A, Kruck. Prices and Earnings Around the Globe. 
Zuricx Union Bank of Switzerland, 1979. p. 11. 
51/ U.S. Congress. House Committee on Ways and Means. Subcommittee 
on ~rade. United States-Japan Trade Report 1980, Committee Print, Washington, 
U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1980. p. 1. 
import tariffs on 29 commodity items, abolishing nontariff barriers which 
hamper imports, simplifying highly co~plicated import procedures, and generally 
relaxing the remaining import controls. 521 Japan responded by promising to 
move up tariff reductions on 1,600 commodities (scheduled to occur in future 
years) and to reduce nontariff barriers on 67 of 99 items on which complaints 
had been received. 
In 1982, Japan's import barriers, in particular nontariff barriers, became a 
primary target of U.S. legislation aimed at attaining reciprocity in market access 
between the United States and major trading partners. 531 Trade negotiations 
traditionally have hinged on offers of reciprocal trade concessions usually 
presented as a package of reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers. Such 
concessions, however, generally did not require equal market access on an in- 
dustry by industry basis across countries. Nations with a recent history 
of protectionism, moreover, could offer much, because they had much to give. 
As currently envisaged, reciprocity would tend to de-emphasize past concessions 
and focus on current market access for competitive U.S. products on an industry 
by industry basis. It also would expand coverage to include, not only merchandise, 
but services and investment. Proposed U.S. reciprocity legislation would require 
the U.S. President to determine which foreign markets are less open than those 
in the United States, pursue remedies under current dispute settlement procedures, 
and if necessary, retaliate against the exports of the country in question. 
Japan has viewed the reciprocity 
feel that such reciprocity would only 
proposals with some alarm. Many in Japan 
promote protectionism. 541 
521' Cullison, A.E. U.S. Nudges 
~ovemGr 18, 1981. p.  l A ,  7A.  
Japanese on Trade. Journal of Commerce, 
531 See, for example, S. 2071, S.2094, and H.R. 5457, 97th Congress. -
54/ Cullison, A. E. Japanese Hit US Plan for Trade. Journal of Commerce. 
Jan. 12, 1982. p. 1A. 
V. LEVEL AND COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF TRADE 
A. Export Levels. The growth of Japan's exports during the 1960s and 
1970s was phenomenal. Beginning in 1960 at $4.1 billion, Japan's merchandise 
exports grew at an average annual rate of 18.9 percent to reach $129.8 billion 
in 1980. During 1974, the growth rate in merchandise exports reached a high 
of 50.4 percent, although sone of this growth appears to have been merely 
moved forward from 1975. During the 19808, exports are likely to continue to 
grow, but rising protectionism in many markets has caused policymakers to 
reconsider the limits to a strategy requiring such rapid increases in exports. 
(See Table 1. ) 
The growth in Japan's exports can be viewed as the result of both pull 
and push factors. The pull represents increasing demand for Japan's products 
as trade barriers in major countries were reduced and and incomes grew. In 
addition, from the mid-1960s, procurement for the Vietnam War created a 
large market for Japanese goods. The countries involved in the war (or their 
bases) were located relatively close by. One estimate is that in 1971 the 
Indochina conflict added more than a billion dollars to Japanese exports. - 5 5 1  
Another pull factor was the price competitiveness of Japanese products, 
particularly during the 1960s. From 1960 to 1970, Japan's export price index 
increased by only 4 percent. By 1975, however, export prices had jumped 38 
percent, although they declined by 12 percent by 1978. In 1979 and 1980, export 
prices rose 19 percent, but even at that, in 1980 they were only 51 percent 
higher than they were in 1960. (U.S. export prices were 189 percent higher.) 
This price competitiveness facilitated sales of Japanese products abroad. 561 
551 Krause and Sekiguchi, Japan and World Economy, p. 419. -
561 Bank of Japan. Economic Statistics Annual, 1980. Tokyo, Bank of 
~a~anTl981. p. 8. 
Table 1. Japan's Merchandise Exports, Imports and Trade Balance, 1960-80 
(In millions of U.S. dollars and percentages) 
Annual Growth Rate 
Year Exports Imports - a/ Balance of Exports 
a/ Customs clearance basis (includes shipping costs). 
Source: Export and import data from Bank of Japan. Economic Statistics 
Annual, 1977, p. 207 and 1980, p.  223. Japan Posted Trade Deficit for December, 
Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, Jan 25, 1982. p. 7 
During the 1970s the rising quality of Japanese products began to receive 
wide press. Japanese steel, ships, watches, television receivers, stereo equip- 
ment, automobiles, semiconductors, and many other goods gradually developed 
a reputation for being manufactured to high standards and under strict quality 
control. This also worked to increase demand for Japanese exports. 
The push factor for Japan's exports came as domestic markets became 
saturated or as the domestic economy moved into a recession. By 1964, for 
example virtually all households had radios and television sets (monochrome), 
80 percent had bicycles, and each household had an average of 2.7 watches. 571 
New markets had to be found elsewhere. During recessions, moreover, manufacturers 
looked abroad for sales as domestic markets contracted and as accounts receivable 
from domestic wholesalers became increasingly difficult to collecto As recessions 
ended, new export markets often were maintained. With the slower economic growth 
rates of the 1980s, moreover, Japanese firms are likely to be turning to export 
markets for expansion. 
B. Composition of Exports. Japan's exports comprise a variety of pro- 
ducts, virtually all of which are processed to some degree. (See Tables 2 
and 3 . )  During the postwar period, the composition of Japan's exports shifted 
through a technological progression. Primary products, light manufacturers, 
and crude items, which were predominant during the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  were gradually eclipsed 
by heavy industrial goods, complex machinery and equipment, and consurner durables 
which required large capital investment and advanced technology to produce.   his 
is not to say that the earlier products decreased in absolute amounts, but rather 
that those of advanced technology increased much more rapidly, 
5 7 1  Japan. Office of the Prime Minister. Japan Statistical Yearbook, 1968. 
~ o k ~ o 7  Japan Statistical Association, 1969. p. 458-59. 
Table 2. Japan's Exports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-80 
(in millions of U.S. dollars)* 
Conmodi ty 1960 1970 1975 1979 1980 
Foodstuffs 255.9 647.7 760.1 1,206.8 1,588.5 





Nonmetallic mineral manufacturers 169.0 372.4 729.6 1,547.1 1,862.7 
Metals 568.4 3,805.3 12,517.5 18,378.9 21,318.6 
Iron and steel products (388.1) (2,843.7) (10,176.5) (14,113.4) (15,454.2) 
Fabricated metal products (154.7) (713.7) (1,8011) (3,127.0) (3,947.0) 
Nonferrous metals (25.6) (248.0) (539.9) (1,138.5) (1,917.4) 
Machinery and equipment 1,035.1 8,941.3 
Motor vehicles (78.1) (1,337.4) 
Vessels (288.1) (1,409.6) 
Scientific and optical equipment (92.5) (498.5) 
Tape recorders (9.7) (450.8) 
Radio Receivers (144.6) (694.9) 
Power generating machinery (24.1) (238.3) 
Thermionic valves, transistors (6.4) (399.8) 
Office machinery (1.3) (329.4) 
Metalworking machinery (7.8) (115.7) (451.9) (1,534.2) (1,743.2) 
Watches and clocks (3.5) (129.5) (458.2) (1,386.4) (1,733.5) 
Television receivers (2.9) (383.8) (782.8) (1,282.7) (1,660.4) 
Electric generators & equipment (21.7) (156.6) (435.4) (1,243.4) (1,503.4) 
Textile machines (48.4) (196.4) (534.4) (715.6) (871.3) 
Sewing machines (54.7) (129.3) (246.8) (409.6) (465.5) 
Other (251.3) (2,471.3) (9,489.0) (21,647.6) (27,573.6) 
Other commodities 621.7 1,909.0 4,134.5 7,708.0 10,493.8 
Rubber tires and tubes (23.3) (162.2) (545.4) (900.6) (1,382.1) 
Toys (90.0) (137.5) (115.1) (254.1) (335.3) 
Other (508.4) (1,609.3) (3,474.0) (6,553.3) (8,776.4) 
Total 4,054.5 19,317.7 55,752.8 103,031.6 129,807 .O 
"Totals may not add because of rounding. Valued on a free-on-board basis. 
Sources: Bank of Japan. Economic Statistics Annual, 1980. Tokyo, Bank of Japan. 
p. 227-30. Japan Tariff Association. The Summary Report, Trade of Japan. December 
1980. p. 73-80 and March 1976, p. 67-74. Japan Ministry of Finance. Monthly Return 
of the Foreign Trade of Japan, January-Decenber 1960. p. 72-371. 
Table 3. Composition of Exports, Selected Years, 1960-80 
(percentages)" 







Nonmetallic Mineral Manufacturers 4.2 1.9 1.3 1.5 1.4 
Metals 
Iron and Steel products 
Fabricated Metal products 
Nonferrous Metals 
Machinery and Equipment 25.5 
Motor Vehicles (1.9) 
Vessels (7.1) 
Scientific and Optical Equipment (2.3) 
Tape Recorders (0.2) 
Radio Receivers (3.6) 
Power Generating Machinery (0.6) 
Thermionic Valves, Transistors, etc. (0.2) 
Office Machinery 
Metalworking Machinery 
Watches and Clocks 
Television Receivers 





Rubber Tires and Tubes 
Toys 
Other 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*Totals may not add because of rounding. 
Source: See Table 2. 
Between 1960 and 1980, for example, foodstuffs fell from 6 to 1 percent 
of total exports. Textiles, likewise, fell from 30 to 5 percent, and other 
manufacturers dropped from 15 to 8 percent. Nonmetallic mineral manufacturers 
also declined from 4 percent in 1960 to 1 percent in 1980. 
Over the same period, exports of higher technology items, such as machinery 
and equipment, soared from 26 to 63 percent of total exports. Metals and 
chemicals increased slightly. Major exports in 1980 were motor vehicles, 
iron and steel products, vessels, and scientific and optical equipment. 
C. Import Levels. During the 1960s and 1970s, imports grew in tandem with 
exports. In a sense, import growth was constrained by exports, because exports 
generated the foreign exchange to purchase the imports. Beginning from $4.5 
billion in 1960 (on a customs clearance basis), imports grew at an average 
annual rate of 18.8 percent to reach $140.5 billion in 1980. 
The growth in imports was facilitated by several major factors. The 
most important probably has been the overall growth in the Japanese economy 
and income levels. Another factor has been the price of imports. In 1973, 
Japan's import prices were at essentially the same level as in 1955. By 
1976, however, they had nearly doubled and by 1981 had increased by another 
50 percent. - 581 Each increase in import prices, in particular those of essential 
raw materials and energy, caused ~apan's import bill to rise accordingly. 
In the short-term Japan had little choice but to pay higher prices for imports. 
Its bill for imported crude oil, for example, rose from $23 billion in 1978 
to $53 billion in 1980. 591 
581 Japan. Office of the Prime Minister. Annual Report on the Consumer 
priceyndex, 1979. Tokyo, 1980. p. 12. Bank of Japan. Economic Statistics 
Monthly, May 1981. p. 12. 
59/ Japan Tariff Association. Summary Report, Trade of Japan, December, -
1980. p. 87. 
A third major factor explaining the increase in imports has been trade 
liberalization. Reduced tariff rates and a weakening of other barriers to 
trade have enabled imports to compete more fully in Japan's markets. The 
appreciation of the yen after 1971, moreover, caused imports to be less 
expensive for Japanese buyers. 
In the short-term, the level of imports tends to fluctuate with Japan's 
domestic economy. When the economy expands, imports also grow. During recessions, 
when growth slackens or turns negative, imports also slow down or decline. 
D. Composition of Imports. Japan imports a wide range of products, al- 
though energy, raw materials, and food have been the major items. (See Tables 
4 and 5.) It experienced the largest growth, however, in imports of mineral 
fuels, (petroleum, coal, and other fuels, mainly because of price increases), 
which rose from 17 percent of all imports in 1960 to 50 percent in 1980. The 
only other major category of imports to gain in terms of the percentage of total 
imports was the miscellaneous category, which rose from 7 percent in 1960 to 
11 percent in 1980. 
All other categories of imports declined as a percent of total imports, 
although in absolute terms, they grew quite rapidly. Over the 1960 to 1980 
period, raw materials declined from 17 to 9 percent of total imports. Metal 
ores and scrap, likewise, declined from 15 to 6 percent. 
The most precipitous decline, however, was in textile materials (mainly 
cotton and wool), which fell from 17 percent to 2 percent of total imports. 
This one statistic tells much about the diversification of Japan's economy away 
from textiles and the growing popularity of locally produced synthetic fibers. 
Food imports rose from 12 percent of total imports in 1960 to 15 percent 
in 1975 only to fall to 10 percent by 1980. Foodstuff imports include animal 
feeds, such as corn and grains, but not soy beans. Similar declines occurred 
in imports of chemicals and in machinery and equipment. 
Table 4. Japa2's Imports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1960-80 
(in millions of United States dollars)* 
- 
Commodity 1960 1970 1975 197 9 1980 










Metal Ores and Scrap 673.2 2,696.3 4,416.6 
Iron ore and ferrous scrap (443.4) (1,549.3) (2,568.4) 
Nonferrous metal ores (155.6) (1,064.1) (1,763.2) 
Other (74.2) (82.9) (85.0) 
Raw Materials 773.5 3,017.7 5,718.7 
Wood (170.3) (1,572.1) (2,620.6) 
Soy beans (107.4) (365.8) (940.3) 
Natural rubber (125.8) (115.3) (155.5) 
0 ther (370.0) (964.5) (2,002.3) 
flineral Fuels 741.6 3,905.5 25,640.9 
Petroleum and products (600.4) (2,785.5)(20,995.2) 
Coal (141.2) (1,010.1) (3,454.4) 
Other (0.0) (109.9) (1,191.3) 
Chemicals 265.2 1,000.5 2,057.3 
Machinery and Equipment 434.9 2,297.7 4,286.0 
Precision Instruments (26.8) (165.5) (455.2) 
Office machines (52.9) (322.4) (504.9) 
Aircraft (29.2) (294.4) (368.9) 
0 ther (326.0) (1,560.4) (2,957.0) 
Miscellaneous commodities 293.5 2,426.7 5,404.2 
Nonferrous metals (118.4) (944.8) (1,284.5) 
Textiles (19.0) (314.5) (1,310.4) 
Iron and steel products (87.6) (276.1) (188.5) 
Other (68.5) (891.3) (2,620.8) 
Total 4,491.1 18,881.2 57,863.1 
*Totals may not add because of rounding. Valued on a customs-clearance basis. 
Source: Based on information from Bank of Japan, Econonic Statistics Annual, 
1980, Tokyo, p. 231-34. Japan, Ministry of Finance, Monthly Return of the Foreign 
Trade of Japan, January-December, 1960, Tokyo, p. 72-371. Japan Tariff Association. 
The Summary Report, Trade of Japan, December 1980. Tokyo, p. 82-89 and March 1976, 
p. 76-83. 
Table 5. Composition of Imports, Selected Years, 1960-1980 
(percentages)* 










Metal Ores and Scrap 
Iron Ore and Ferrous Scrap 
























*Totals may not add because of rounding. 
Source: See table 4. 
In terms of in ividual commodities, major imports were petroleum and 
products, wood, coal, iron ore, and other ores. The Japanese government's 
strategy of importing raw materials and exporting finished products in order 
to maintain its high standard of living is amply revealed in this list of 
Japan's major imports. 
The predominance of energy and raw materials in Japan's imports implies 
that its strategy of import-substituting industrialization has proceeded nearly 
as far as it can go. The products that Japan now imports generally have no 
domestic substitute. Raw material, energy, and food imports, moreover, are ex- 
pected to increase as the economy grows. In order to balance its external trade 
accounts, therefore, Japan is being forced to turn to higher value-added exports 
and to manufacturing processes that conserve on raw material or energy inputs. 
E. Balance of Merchandise Trade. Between 1960 and 1964, Japan incurred 
annual deficits (on a customs clearance basis for imports) ranging from $0.4 
to $1.5 billion. By 1965, however, this pattern began to shift. From 1965 to 
1969, the balance alternated between deficit and surplus. By 1969, with a 
positive balance of $966 million, Japan's trade position was widely regarded 
as having achieved a position of that of a surplus trading nation. - 60/ 
By 1972, the trade surplus had ballooned to $5.1 billion. (See Table 1) 
The rapid rise in the prices of petroleum and raw materials during 1973, 
however, plunged Japan's balance of trade into deficit. In 1974, the deficit 
reached $6.6 billion. Japan's determined exporters, however, soon reversed 
the trend toward deficit, and by 1976 the balance again registered a surplus. 
This surplus grew to a record $18.2 million in 1978. 
60/ Witaker, Donald P., et. al. Area Handbook for Japan. 3rd ed. Washington, 
U.S. Zvt. Print. Off., 1974. p. 500. Note: Custons clearance figures tend 
to overstate the size of merchandise trade deficits. 
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The second o i l  c r i s i s  i n  1979, however, aga in  pushed t h e  ba lance  of 
t r a d e  i n t o  d e f i c i t .  With consecut ive  d e f i c i t s  of $7.6 and $10.7 b i l l i o n ,  i n  
1979 and 1980, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  count ry  appeared t o  be  heading f o r  a  long 
s t r u g g l e  with adverse e x t e r n a l  ba lances .  By 1981, however, a  world g l u t  o f  
petroleum so£  tened p r i c e s  and, concu r r en t ly ,  because o f  conserva t ion  and a  
slowing economy, consumption demand weakened. ~ a p a n '  s  r ap id  expor t  growth, 
moreover, helped r e t u r n  i t s  t r a d e  balance t o  su rp lus .  - 611 
J a p a n ' s  experience with i t s  balance of t r a d e  over t h e  pas t  two decades 
i l l u s t r a t e s  a  fundamental weakness and s t r e n g t h  t h a t  l i k e l y  w i l l  p e r s i s t .  
The country i s  h i g h l y  vu lne rab l e  t o  i nc reases  i n  t h e  p r i c e  of  petroleum and 
raw m a t e r i a l s .  Without c l o s e  s u b s t i t u t e s ,  when p r i c e s  r i s e ,  i t  has  l i t t l e  
choice  but t o  pay them, which causes  i t s  import b i l l  t o  r i s e  d r a m a t i c a l l y .  
J apan ' s  s t r e n g t h ,  however, i s  t h a t  i t s  export  s e c t o r  i s  ab l e  t o  respond 
r a p i d l y  t o  match i n c r e a s e s  i n  impor t s .  This  i s  p a r t l y  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  
system of f l o a t i n g  exchange r a t e s  which au toma t i ca l l y  works t o  b r i n g  e x t e r n a l  
accounts  i n t o  ba lance .  Countr ies  wi th  d e f i c i t s  i n  t h e i r  ba lance  of  t r a d e  ( i f  
not  o f f s e t  by su rp luses  e l sewhere) ,  experience a  d e p r e c i a t i n g  currency which 
tends  t o  reduce imports and inc rease  expor t s .  
I n  J apan ' s  ca se ,  however, t h e  a b i l i t y  of  e x p o r t e r s  t o  expand s a l e s  abroad 
while  commanding premium p r i c e s  f o r  t h e i r  products  seems remarkable .  Following 
t h e  1973 o i l  c r i s i s ,  f o r  example, when J a p a n ' s  import b i l l  r o s e  by some $39 
b i l l i o n ,  i t s  export  i n d u s t r i e s  increased  t h e i r  s a l e s  by $27 b i l l i o n .  
As a  no t e  o f  cau t ion ,  t h e  customs c learance  t r a d e  s t a t i s t i c s  t h a t  Japan 
p r e f e r s  t o  c i t e  tend t o  o v e r s t a t e  t he  amount of  t h e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  ( ~ u r o ~ e a n  
611 Sa to ,  Akihiro.  Japan Fears  
~ r i c t z n .  Asian Wall S t r e e t  Jou rna l ,  
Trade Surplus  W i l l  Spark Renewed 
August 31 ,  1981. p .  1, 2 0 .  
nations and even the United States at times also use these figures.) These 
data include sliipping costs, even though in balance of payments accounting, 
such costs are picked up as imports of services. If shipping costs are 
excluded from imports, Japan has not incurred a merchandise trade deficit 
since 1963, even during the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. (See Table 6.) 
Table 6. Japan's Exports, Imports, Trade Balance, Net Service Exports, 
Net Transfers, and Current Account Balance, 1961-80 
(millions of U.S. dollars) 
Trade Net Current 
Year Exports Imports A a/ Balance Services Transfers Account Balance 
a_/ Imports are valued f.0.b. (free on board). 
Source: Bank of Japan. Balance of Payments Monthly, March 1970 
( p .  1-21, May 1973 (p. 1-2), March 1974 (p. 1-2), Feb. 1981 (p. 1-2). 
VI. BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
The balance on current account, which includes invisibles as well as 
merchandise, is generally accepted as a more comprehensive indicator of the 
trade performance of a nation than the merchandise trade balance. It should 
be noted that invisibles, such as services, also generate employment or income. 
A. Services. Since 1961, Japan's net service trade has been in deficit. 
Trade in services includes transportation (freight and passenger fares), in- 
surance, travel expenditures, and income from investments. In 1980, a service 
trade deficit of $11.3 million was formed from service exports of $31.5 
billion and imports of $42.8 billion. This deficit can be broken down into 
a $4.3 billion deficit in transportation, a $3.9 billion deficit in travel 
expenditures, a $0.8 billion surplus in investment income, and a $3.9 billion 
deficit in other services. g/ 
In transportation, the largest deficits occur in freight, charter fees, 
and port fees. In travel expenses, the deficit reflects the larger number of 
Japanese businessmen and tourists who travel abroad than foreigners who 
travel in Japan. In investment income, the small surplus relects the greater 
amount of Japanese investment overseas compared with foreign investment in 
Japan. In other services, a surplus existed in military transactions, but 
there were deficits in management fees, patent royalties, and other fees. 
Adding net exports of services and net unilateral transfers (mostly 
remittances) to the merchandise trade balance (free-on-board) gives the balance 
on current account. In this balance, Japan began to register surpluses from 
62/ Bank of Japan. Balance of Payments Monthly, Feb. 1981. p. 23-46. -
1965 and has generally kept in the black with the exception of 1967 and the 
years following the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979. In 1979, Japan's current 
account balance registered a deficit of $8.7 billion, followed by another 
deficit of $10.7 billion in 1980. In 1981, the balance turned to surplus again. 
The current account balance exerts a large influence on the value of the 
yen in foreign exchange markets. It represents the major demand for and supply 
of foreign currency to Japan. The current account, however, does not reflect 
three other types of international transactions: long- and short-term capital 
flows and official settlements (payments by central governments). 
B. Capital Flows. Capital movements consist of the international short- 
and long-term loans governments or private entities make with or receive from 
each other. A short-term capital credit for Japan, for example, would occur 
when an American buys a Japanese bond. A debit would arise when a Japanese 
opens a British savings account. A long-term capital credit would arise when 
an American company establishes a subsidiary in Japan, while a debit would 
occur when a Japanese company builds a plant abroad. 
Following World War 11, unlike Japan's rapid reentry into the international 
trading world, its return to world capital markets was slow and deliberate. 
Even before the war, however, Japan did not participate in world capital markets 
to the same extent as the United States or European countries. In recent years, 
however, capital flows have become more important in the balance of payments 
and their impact on the evolution of Japan's economy. 631 
As might be expected of a country recovering from a major defeat, Japan 
remained a net debtor nation until the mid-1960s. By 1967, however, total Japanese 
631 Krause and Sekiguchi, Japan and World Economy, p. 440. -
investments overseas began to exceed foreign investments in Japan, which changed 
it from a net debtor to a net creditor nation. Japan's major form of borrowing 
came in loans designed to assist domestic industrial development, but gradually 
shifted more toward international sales of stocks. 641 
As Japan shifted from a net debtor to net creditor nation, earnings 
on the foreign investment account also shifted from deficit to surpus. (These 
earnings are counted as services in the current account.) Net income from 
investments turned positive at the end of 1971 and reached $854 million in 1980. 651 
From 1945 to around 1965, when Japan perceived that it was being threatened 
with balance-of-payments deficits, rigorous controls were placed on outflows 
of capital. Long-term capital inflows also were controlled, partly as a means 
of limiting foreign involvement in Japan's economy but also to prevent a burdensome 
repayment problem from developing. In principle, direct investment by foreign 
firms for the purpose of establishing new businesses was forbidden. The purchase 
of shares of existing firms also was restricted to about 5 percent or less 
for one investor. 661 In order to tap sources of foreign technology, licensing 
agreements with foreign firms were encouraged (rather than allowing direct 
investments). The government allowed limited short-term financing arrangements 
through foreign loans and debentures, but these tended to be subject to considerable 
government control. 671 
641 Bank of Japan. Balance of Payments Monthly, February 1981. p. 47ff. -
651 Ibid., p. 23-36. -
661 Japan External Trade Organization. Operating a Business in Japan. 
TO~~OTJETRO, c. 1974. p. 3-4. 
671 Whitaker, Area Handbook, p.  522. Krause and Sekiguchi, Japan and World -
Economy, p. 440-41. 
By 1967, however, the Japanese government began to lift its restrictions 
on international capital transactions. By 1973, all industries, except for 
five, in principle, were opened for foreign firms to establish totally owned 
subsidiaries. Seventeen additional industries, however, were restricted to 
either 50 percent ownership or a case-by-case ruling on foreign ownership. 
The 1973 liberalization also removed limitations on the purchase of a con- 
trolling share of existing firms by foreign enterprises, provided the firm 
whose shares were being purchased gave its consent. 
On December 1, 1980, Japan's new Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law went into effect. Under this law, all external economic transactions are 
free, unless specified otherwise. Restrictions can be imposed only as exceptional 
actions to meet an emergency, such as unusual instability in the foreign exchange 
markets or an abnormally large movement in funds. This represented a complete 
reversal from the previous legal system where all economic transactions were 
controlled unless specified otherwise. 681 
Under the new law, the Japanese government still can specifically invoke 
any of several criteria to declare a particular transaction illegal. The govern- 
ment, for example, retains the power to limit foreign ownership of companies whose 
takeover would "cause a grave impact upon the country's economy and security." 
As of 1981, this clause had been used to justify limiting foreign ownership to 
between 25 and 50 percent in 11 companies, mostly in energy and high technology. 691 
68/ Matsuda, Osamu. New Exchange Law Goes Into Effect. Japan Economic 
~ o u r n x ,  v. 18, Nov. 15, 1980. p. 11-1. 
69/ Kanabayashi, Masayoshi. Japan Relaxes Investment Rules for Foreigners. 
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 1, 1980. p. 31. ) 
As international capital and foreign exchange transactions have been 
gradually liberalized, both imports and exports of capital have increased. 
From 1964, when the balance of long-term capital flows turned negative, 
to 1979, the balance has continued to grow in a negative direction. Japanese 
investments overseas were rising faster than foreign investments in Japan. 
In 1978 and 1979, the negative balance exceeded $12 billion. In 1980, however, 
Japanese investments abroad dropped by $4 billon, while foreign investments 
in Japan soared by $10 billion over their 1979 levels. As a result, in 1980, 
the long-term capital balance registered a positive $2 billion. (See Table 7.) 
Over the 1951-80 period, Japan approved a total of 23,948 cases of 
direct investment overseas for a value of $36.5 billion. Of this total, 
manufacturing accounted for 35 percent, mining for 19 percent, and commerce 
for 15 percent. By region, 27 percent went to both North America and Asia, 
17 percent to Latin America, 13 percent to Europe, 11 percent to Oceania and 
Africa, and 6 percent to the Middle East. 701 
As of the end of 1980, Japanese held assets from foreign direct investments 
in the United States of $4.2 billion (53% in trade, 20% in manufacturing, and 
the rest in petroleum, insurance and other activities). Americans held assets 
in Japan worth $6.3 billion (48% in manufacturing, 25% in petroleum, 18% in 
trade, and the rest in banking, finance, and other activities). 711 
701 Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1981, p. 42-43. -
71/ Whichard, Obie G. U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1980. Survey of -
Current Business, v. 61, Aug. 1981. p. 32. Chung, William K. and Gregory C. 
Fouch. Foreign Direct Investment in the United States in 1980. Survey of 
Current Business, v. 61, Bug. 1981. p. 41. 
T a b l e  7 .  J a p a n ' s  Balance o f  Payments, C a p i t a l  Flows, O f f i c i a l  S e t t l e m e n t s ,  
and F o r e i g n  Exchange Reserves ,  1961-1980 
( m i l l i o n s  o f  U.S. d o l l a r s )  
Year Long-term Short- term E r r o r s  Balance Gold and F o r e i g n  Exchange 
Capi t a1  Capi t a 1  and o f  Reserves  (end o f  yea r )  
Flows Flows Omissions Payments - a /  Change Level 
unr  e  por 
O f f i c i a l  S e t t l e m e n t s  = Balance of Payments Cur ren t  Account Balance + 
Flows + E r r o r s  and Omissions.  E r r o r s  can b e  t r a c e d  t o  r e p o r t i n g  m i s t a k e s ,  
t e d  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  and l e a d s  o r  l a g s  i n  payments when exchange r a t e  a r e  
f l u c t u a t i n g .  
b /  I n c l u d e s  gold  t r a n s c h e  ( t r a n s f e r  of r e s e r v e s )  of  $180 m i l l i o n .  - 
c /  I n c l u d e s  $122 m i l l i o n  i n  S p e c i a l  Drawing R i g h t s .  - 
d /  I n c l u c e s  $128 m i l l i o n  i n  SDR's. - 
e /  I n c l u d e s  $160 m i l l i o n  i n  SDR's. - 
Sources :  Bank of  Japan .  Balance o f  Payments Monthly. J a n .  1968 ( P .  1-2) ,  
Oc t .  1976 ( p .  1-2) ,  Feb. 1981 , (p .  1-21. Economic S t a t i s t i c s  Annual 1980.  
p .  243. 
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I n  terms of d i r e c t  overseas  investments  ou t s t and ing ,  Japanese bus ines se s  
a r e  s t i l l  f a r  behind those  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  t h e  United Kingdom, o r  West 
Germany. The t rend  and momentum, however, a r e  i n  ~ a ~ a n ' s  f avo r .  The Japanese 
a r e  on a f a s t  t r a c k ,  and t h e i r  outward expansion i s  l i k e l y  t o  a c c e l e r a t e .  Over 
t he  1978-80 pe r iod ,  Japanese d i r e c t  overseas  investments  each year  averaged 
$4.6 bil l ion--more than  t h e  cumulative amount i n  1970. 721 
The mot iva t ion  behind t h e  Japanese overseas  investment d r i v e  stems from 
s e v e r a l  sources .  F i r s t  i s  t h e  r i s i n g  c o s t  o f  land and l a b o r  i n  Japan.  This  
makes investments  i n  c o u n t r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  As i a ,  w i th  lower wage and over- 
head c o s t s  q u i t e  a t t r a c t i v e .  Second i s  t h e  need f o r  investment i n  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  
handle  export  s a l e s .  Third a r e  J apan ' s  t i g h t e n i n g  p o l l u t i o n  c o n t r o l  requirements  
which have encouraged a move overseas  b y  c e r t a i n  k inds  o f  smel t ing  and process ing  
p l a n t s .  Fourth i s  t h e  voracious Japanese a p p e t i t e  f o r  raw m a t e r i a l s ,  energy,  
and food. Many of Japan '  s  investments  a r e  i n  mining,  energy f a c i l i t i e s  , o r  
food product ion.  
The f i f t h  motive a r i s e s  from b a r r i e r s  t o  Japanese expor t s  i n  va r ious  
markets.  R e s t r i c t i o n s  on automotive expor t s  t o  t h e  United Kingdom, A u s t r a l i a ,  
and many o the r  c o u n t r i e s ,  f o r  example, have forced Japanese automakers t o  e s t a b l i s h  
assembly p l a n t s  t h e r e .  The same has  been t r u e  f o r  p l a n t s  manufactur ing t e l e v i s i o n  
r e c e i v e r s .  Firms expor t i ng  from developing c o u n t r i e s ,  moreover, even i f  owned 
by Japanese companies, u s u a l l y  r ece ive  p r e f e r e n t i a l  t a r i f f  t rea tment  i n  developed 
country markets (under t h e  Generalized System of P re fe rences ) .  And s i x t h ,  l o c a l  
governments o f t e n  provide f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  i n  t h e  form o f  reduced t a x e s  o r  
721 Japanese Mul t i na t iona l s ,  Covering t h e  World wi th  Investment .  
~ u s i n z s  Week, June 16 ,  1980. p. 92-93. 
subsidies for firms locating in their jurisdiction, 731 -
Flows into Japan of short-term capital have generally exceeded outflows. 
During the 1960s, the annual balance averaged $137 million. During the 1970s 
it averaged $1,155 million and reached $3,071 million in 1980. The bulk of 
short-term capital is in trade credits. 741 -
Japanese bond markets have also been developing as a source of international 
financing. In 1970, the first such yen-denominated bond issue was floated by 
the Asian Development Bank. This was followed by similar issues by the World 
Bank and syndicates of Japanese banks. E/ 
The addition of capital flows (plus errors and omissions) to the balance 
on current account provides what is termed the balance of payments or official 
settlements. This represents final government action to balance inflow and 
outflow transactions in the international sector. Sincee1961, Japan's balance 
of payments has generally been in surplus, with the notable exception of 
the years following the oil crises in 1973 and 1979. 
Most of the deficit or surplus in the balance of payments is accommodated 
by changes in government holdings of gold and foreign exchange. Since Japan 
has usually enjoyed a surplus in this account, its official reserves of gold 
and foreign exchange have increased during the past two decades. Starting from 
$1.49 billion in 1961, its official reserves rose to $15.23 billion by 1971, 
peaked at $33.02 billion in 1978, and dropped to $25.23 billion in 1980. 
731 Japan, MITI, White Paper on International Trade 1981, p. 127-29. -
74/ Bank of Japan. Balance of Paynents Monthly, Feb. 1981. p. 59. -
75/ Whitaker, Area Handbook, p. 525. -
VII. VALUE OF THE YEN 
The relative value of the yen is determined in foreign exchange markets 
by the forces of demand and supply. The demand for yen arises from the demand 
for what the yen will buy by foreigners in Japan--either goods and services 
or investments. The supply of yen arises from the desire of yen holders to 
exchange their yen for dollars, marks, or other foreign exchange in order 
to purchase something abroad. An excess of Japanese exports (excess demand 
for yen), therefore, will tend to increase the value of the yen. An import 
surplus (excess supply of yen), likewise, will tend to decrease the value 
of the yen. 
Capital flows enter foreign exchange markets in the same manner as imports 
and exports. Markets do not differentiate between someone buying foreign ex- 
change for a capital or merchandise transaction. A surplus in a country's 
current account, therefore, can be offset by a deficit in capital flows. 
Likewise, a current account surplus can be exacerabated by a similar surplus 
in capital flows. 
Governments also intervene to influence either the supply of or demand 
for a currency. If the yen is either depreciating or appreciating more than 
market conditions seem to warrant, the Japanese government often will intervene 
by either buying or selling yen on the foreign exchange market. 
Prior to the 1970s, Japan also maintained control over foreign exchange 
transactions in order to reduce the demand for foreign exchange. Its import 
restrictions also worked in a similar manner to reduce demand for foreign 
currencies and prop up the value of the yen. 
In 1949, the value of the yen was set at 360 per dollar as part of an American 
plan to stabilize prices in the Japanese economy. Japan maintained that exchange 
rate until 1971, when former U.S. President Nixon abandoned dollar convertibility 
to gold, imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports, and set in motion a series 
of changes that eventually led to floating exchange rates. 76/ By that time 
the yen had become undervalued, Japanese exports were costing too little 
in international markets and imports from abroad were costing Japanese too 
much to buy. This was reflected in Japan's current account balance which 
had risen from deficits in the early 1960s to a $5.8 billion surplus in 1971. 
The time was ripe for the "Nixon dollar shock." 
Following the U.S. measures to devalue the dollar, the Japanese government 
attempted to keep the yen from appreciating too rapidly by buying dollars and 
selling yen on the foreign exchange market. Over 1971 and 1972, the Bank of 
Japan bought nearly $14 billion worth of foreign exchange, which was added to 
its official reserves. While this reduced the exchange losses by Japan's 
multinational corporations, Japan paid dearly for the resulting increase in 
its domestic money supply by the virulent inflation it suffered in 1973 and 
1974. 77/ -
By the end of 1971, the yen had appreciated from 360 to 314 yen per dollar. 
By the end of 1972, it was up further to 302 yen per dollar and peaked temporarily 
at 265 yen per dollar in 1973 before the impact of the oil crisis began to be 
felt. Over the ensuing recession, the yen weakened to an average of 297 yen 
per dollar in 1976, but regained strength over 1978 to register an average of 
76/ Nanto, U.S. Role, p. 247-58. 
A 
77/ Hayden, Eric W. Internationalizing Japan's Financial System. An 
occasional Paper of the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International 
Policy, Stanford University. Dec. 1980. p. v. Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. OECD Economic Surveys, Japan. Paris, OECD, 1972. 
p. 31-35. 
219 yen per dollar in 1979. On occasion, short-term fluctuations took the value 
to about 180 yen per dollar. 781 
With the large increase in oil prices in 1979 and ensuing deficits in Japan's 
trade and current account balances, the yen weakened to 227 yen per dollar by 1980. 
Considerable intervention by the Japanese government, which saw its official re- 
serves of foreign exchange drop from $33 billion in 1978 to $20 billion in 1979, 
plus large inflows of capital, however, kept the yen surprisingly strong. In 
1981, with high U.S. interest rates and a strong dollar, the yen depreciated 
slightly against its 1980 level. 
Table 8. Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate, 1970-81 
Year: 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Rate: 360 351 303 271 291 292 297 269 211 219 227 221 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
Dec. 1975, p. 220-21 and Feb. 1982, p. 225-26. 
Annual averages of the yenldollar exchange rate mask sizable short-term fluc- 
tuations. In 1979, for example, although the average exchange rate was 219 
yen per dollar, monthly averages ranged from 198 to 249. These large swings 
in relative exchange rates can negate gains in tariff concessions and change 
relative costs of production faster than investment in new plant and equipment 
can occur in response to the changes. An industry can enjoy a comfortable 
international cost advantage one year and similar cost disadvantage the next-- 
not because of underlying productivity changes but because of fluctuations in 
781 International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various -
issues. 
t h e  exchange r a t e .  I n s t a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  exchange r a t e ,  r a t h e r  t han  t h e  r a t e ' s  
being considered t o  be  t o o  h igh  o r  t o o  low, appears  t o  i n v i t e  government 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange market. 
With J apan ' s  new Foreign Exchange Law, which came i n t o  e f f e c t  December 1, 
1980, t h e  government has  even l e s s  c o n t r o l  over  t h e  exchange r a t e  than  i t  
d id  i n  t he  pas t .  Traders  and i n v e s t o r s  dea l ing  wi th  Japan, t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e  being 
sub jec t  t o  cons iderab ly  more exchange r i s k  t han  i n  previous per iods.  
V I I I .  DIRECTION OF TRADE 
Japan t r a d e s  wi th  n e a r l y  e v e r y  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  wor ld .  S i n c e  t h e  mid-1950s, 
however, i t s  e x p o r t  marke t s  have been s h i f t i n g  from d e v e l o p i n g  t o  developed 
c o u n t r i e s .  ( s e e  Table  9 . )  I n  t e rms  o f  merchandise  e x p o r t s ,  i n  1980, 47 .1  p e r c e n t  
went t o  developed c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  h i g h  income l e v e l s .  Another 4 5 . 8  p e r c e n t  found 
marke t s  i n  t h e  deve lop ing  c o u n t r i e s ,  and 7 .1  p e r c e n t  were s o l d  t o  Communist 
c o u n t r i e s .  The l a r g e s t  customer was t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  (24.2 p e r c e n t  o f  e x p o r t s ) ,  
followed by West Germany, South Korea,  Taiwan, t h e  P e o p l e ' s  Republ ic  o f  China ,  
Saudia  A r a b i a ,  and Hong Kong a l l  a t  t h e  much lower  l e v e l  o f  between 3 . 7  and 
4 . 4  p e r c e n t  e a c h .  - 791 
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o u n t r i e s  from which Japan buys goods r e f l e c t s  i t s  
needs  t o  import  food,  energy ,  and raw m a t e r i a l s .  I n  1980,  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s  
supp l ied  60.3  pe rcen t  of J a p a n ' s  impor t s  w i t h  about h a l f  coming from t h e  Middle  
E a s t .  (See Table 10.) The developed c o u n t r i e s  provided 35 .0  p e r c e n t  of J a p a n ' s  
i m p o r t s ,  and t h e  communist c o u n t r i e s  t h e  remaining 4 . 7  p e r c e n t .  I n  t e rms  o f  
s p e c i f i c  c o u n t r i e s ,  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  w i t h  17.4  p e r c e n t  and Saud ia  Arab ia  w i t h  
13 .9  pe rcen t  a r e  t h e  l e a d i n g  e x p o r t e r s  t o  Japan .  They a r e  fol lowed by I n d o n e s i a ,  
t h e  Uni ted Arab Emira tes ,  A u s t r a l i a ,  Canada, I r a q ,  China,  I r a n ,  M a l a y s i a ,  and 
Kuwait . 
The s t r u c t u r e  o f  J a p a n ' s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  n a t u r a l l y  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  f r i c t i o n .  J a p a n ' s  problem i s  t h a t  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  economic wel l -  
be ing  r e s t s  p a r t l y  on  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  import  food ,  e n e r g y ,  and raw m a t e r i a l s  
and expor t  f i n i s h e d  p roduc t s .  I n  most c a s e s ,  t h e  c o u n t r i e s  which provide 
Japan w i t h  impor t s  o f  e s s e n t i a l  commodities d o  no t  have t h e  p o p u l a t i o n ,  
791 K e i z a i  Koho, Japan 1981,  p .  32-33. -
Table  9 .  J a p a n ' s  Expor t s  by Country Groups and S e l e c t e d  C o u n t r i e s ,  
S e l e c t e d  Years ,  1961-80 
( i n  m i l l i o n s  o f  U.S. d o l l a r s )  
- 
Country  Groups and S e l e c t e d  C o u n t r i e s  1961 1965 1970 1975 1979 1980 
Developed C o u n t r i e s  




A u s t r a l i a  
Developing Areas 
Noncommunist As ia  
of  which: Rep. o f  Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Tha i l and  
P h i l i p p i n e s  
I n d o n e s i a  
I n d i a  
Middle E a s t  
L a t i n  America 
A f r i c a  (Excluding South A f r i c a )  
Other  
Coxmuni s t  C o u n t r i e s  
of  which: Sov ie t  Union 
P e o p l e ' s  Rep. of  China 
T o t a l  Expor t s  
Source:  Bank o f  Japan.  Balance o f  Payments Monthly, J a n .  1968, p .  15-16, Feb. 
1981,  p. 15-16. 
Table  10. J a p a n ' s  Impor t s  by Country Group and S e l e c t e d  C o u n t r i e s ,  
S e l e c t e d  Years ,  1961-1980. (Customs Clea rance  B a s i s )  
( i n  m i l l i o n s  of U.S. d o l l a r s )  
Country Group and S e l e c t e d  C o u n t r i e s  1961 1965 1970 197 5 1979 1980 
Developed C o u n t r i e s  
of which: Uni ted S t a t e s  
Canada 
West Germany 
Uni ted Kingdom 
A u s t r a l i a  
Developing Areas  
Noncommunist Asia 
of which: Rep. of Korea 
Taiwan 
Tha i land  
P h i l i p p i n e s  
I n d o n e s i a  
I n d i a  
Malaysia  
Middle E a s t  
L a t i n  America 
A f r i c a  (Excluding South A f r i c a )  
Other  
Communist C o u n t r i e s  
of which: S o v i e t  Union 
P e o p l e ' s  Rep. of China 
T o t a l  Impor t s  
Source:  Bank of Japan.  Balance of Payments Elonthly, J a n .  1968, p. 19-20, Feb. 
1981, p., 19-20. 
income levels, or trading ties with Japan to buy sufficient finished products 
to bring bilateral trade into balance. (See Table 11.) 
The oil exporting countries, for example, continue to run large trade sur- 
pluses with Japan. In order to offset its deficits in trade with those countries, 
Japan must run trade surpluses with other countries. In 1980, for example, 
Japan's $30 billion bilateral merchandise trade deficit with the Middle East 
was met partly by surpluses of $7.0 billion with the United States, $5.2 billion 
with South Korea and Taiwan, and $4.0 billion with the countries of Western 
Europe. 
While the nations experiencing bilateral trade deficits with Japan can 
sympathige with Japan's dilemma, the deficits often tend to become politically 
difficult to tolerate. Japan currently is walking an uneasy tightrope in 
trying to balance its need to run bilateral surpluses with countries like 
the United States and its desire not to incite protectionist reactions. 
Table 11. Japan's Bilateral Trade Balances by Country Group and Selected 
Countries, Selected Years, 1961-1980 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Country Group and Selected Countries 1961 1965 1970 1975 1979 1980 
Developed Countries -1,600 112 10 -460 5,715 12,052 
of which: United States -1,029 113 380 -459 5,972 6,959 
Canada -149 -143 -366 -1,348 -2,367 -2,287 
West Germany -1 10 -8 -6 7 522 1,682 3,255 
United Kingdom -22 4 2 85 663 1,416 1,828 
Australia -352 -239 -919 -2,417 -3,691 -3,593 
Developing Areas 137 2 16 263 -3,329 15,345 -25,253 
Noncommunist Asia 409 789 1,889 1,957 -6 7 -84 1 
of which: Rep. of Korea 104 139 589 940 2,888 2,372 
Taiwan 2 8 6 1 44 9 1,010 1,891 2,853 
Thailand 5 6 88 259 235 545 797 
Philippines -28 -14 -7 9 -9 5 3 9 -268 
Indonesia 6 9 56 -321 1,580 -6,670 -9,709 
India -36 20 -287 -187 -273 -99 
Middle East -320 -756 -1,703 -10,402 -18,643 -30,142 
Latin America -136 -219 -186 2,241 2,038 3,217 
Af rica (Excluding South ~frica) 198 411 3 12 2,976 1,518 2,747 
Other -14 - 9 -49 -101 -191 -234 
Communist Countries -114 -49 158 1,677 1,991 2,486 
of which: Soviet Union -80 -72 -140 456 550 918 
People's Rep. of China -14 2 0 3 15 728 744 755 
Total Balance -1,574 283 437 -2,110 -7,640 -10,721 
Source: Based on data in Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments Monthly, Jan. 1968, 
p. 15-20, and Feb. 1981, p. 15-20. 
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